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“If it can be conclusively shown that the state was not entitled to punish a person, it seems to 




The consequences of judicial error can be grave, potentially extending to wrongful loss of fortune, 
liberty, reputation or (in some jurisdictions) life. Such consequences are not always reversible. Thus 
the proper response to judicially occasioned injuries is of crucial importance. The statement quoted 
above offers a rational response to some failures of the justice system and captures rule of law 
concepts such as absence of arbitrary power and equality before the law,
2
 but masks the controversies 
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 Baroness Hale JSC in R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18; [2012] 1 A.C. 48, 
[116]. 
2
 Albert Venn Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed., Macmillan 1959), 188, 193. Dicey’s 




on how the consequences of judicial errors ought to be redressed. The ancient maxim ubi ius ibi 
remedium3 (hereafter “ubi ius”) makes this a key issue to resolve, and recent UK and Commonwealth 
cases on compensation for judicial errors bring it into sharp focus. Holt C.J. (dissenting) famously 
declared in Ashby v White; 
 
“If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and 
a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to 




Similarly, Marshall C.J. said in Marbury v Madison; 
 
“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded … for it is a settled and 
invariable principle in the laws of England that every right, when withheld, must have a 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
criticised. The rule of law is an elusive concept (see J. Laws, “The Constitution: Morals and Rights” 
[1996] P.L. 622, 630) and I do not propose to join the debates on it (but see generally, Trevor Allan, 
Law, Liberty, and Justice (Clarendon Press, 1993); P.P. Craig, “Formal and substantive conceptions of 
the rule of law: an analytical framework” [1997] P.L. 467-487; P.P. Craig, “Constitutional 
foundations, the rule of law and supremacy” [2003] P.L. 92-111; Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law” 
(2007) C.L.J. 67-85). I however note here that the rule of law features strongly in the debates on the 
appropriate response to judicially inflicted injuries. 
3
 Compare the maxims lex semper dabit remedium and ubicunque est iniuria, ibi damnum sequitur. 
4
 (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953; 92 ER 126, 136 (emphasis added). 
5




The emphasised parts of the quoted excerpts indicate that ubi ius is a fundamental common law norm. 
Like the rule of law, it predates modern Western constitutions and rights bills. Both are foundational 
constitutional concepts. Marshall C.J. underlined the associated duty of the state, arguably intrinsic to 
the rule of law, which itself is perhaps the core common law value6;  
 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is 




The modern rights era stresses many important rights. It suffices for present purposes to refer to two 
closely interconnected rights long recognised by the common law; the right to liberty and security of 
the person, and the right not to be deprived wrongfully thereof.
8
 Crucially, violations of these rights 
resulting from judicial error are not always redressed by common law courts, raising the question 
whether they remain “rights”. On one view, whatever the courts will not redress is not a “right” at all, 
for a legal right only exists when courts will provide a remedy. On another view, a right does not cease 
to exist merely because the courts will not redress its violation. Restrictions on its enforcement do not 
extinguish it or even prescribe its conceptual limits. But the courts may, for some reason, choose to 
underenforce a right or norm. 
 
In this article, I seek to establish that, in respect of irreparably injurious rights violations emanating 
from judicial action, the norm that “every man that is injured ought to have his recompense”,
9
 and, 
consequently, the rights whose violations trigger that norm, are being underenforced, inappropriately, 
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 Lord Hope in Jackson v AG [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262, [107]. 
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 5 US 137, 163. 
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 These trace as far back as the Magna Carta (clause 39) which is incorporated in the due process 
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 Amendment to the US Constitution. See also Art.9 ICCPR, Art.5 ECHR. 
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by common law courts. This happens when the courts refuse to hold anyone liable for the violations. 
That position may be justified by the availability of adequate alternative remedies or by compelling 
policy/institutional considerations, but would be untenable where both fall short. The courts do not 
formally acknowledge their responses as underenforcement and do not therefore address the question 
whether the relevant norms are suited for underenforcement. But bringing the judicial responses within 
the framework of underenforcement theory should prompt a new approach, involving (inter alia) 
addressing directly the question whether the relevant norms or values are fit for underenforcement. 
Drawing upon Sager’s underenforcement theory
10
, it will be argued that, while the reasoning 
underpinning the rejections of state liability for irreparable judicially occasioned injuries can be 
interpreted and understood within the context of underenforcement theory, ubi ius is a norm that, 
absent clear, specific, and inescapable statutory impediments, ought to be enforced, even if 
constrainedly. Institutional concerns are tenable when courts face matters that ought to be determined 
by the legislature; but the question who should be liable for judicial wrongs is not such a question. 
Even if it were, legislatures can sometimes adopt minimalist approaches to meeting the state’s 
obligations under human rights law; but courts should shun such approaches. Where the legislature has 
left the matter to the judiciary, institutional considerations should have no place.  
 
This discussion will first examine briefly Sager’s underenforcement theory, followed by an analysis of 
recent case law relating to the UK’s statutory compensation scheme, which exemplifies insufficient 
legislative measures to address the consequences of irreparably injurious judicial errors. After this will 
follow an examination of approaches to primary state liability, which, given the personal immunity of 
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 See generally, L.G. Sager, “Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms” (1977-1978) 91 Harvard L.R. 1212-1264; Lawrence Gene Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A 
Theory of American Constitutional Practice (Yale University Press 2004). On the tensions between 
underenforcement theory and Dworkinian thought, see L.G. Sager, “Material Rights, 
Underenforcement, and the Adjudication Thesis” (2010) 90 B.U.L.Rev. 579; Ronald Dworkin, Justice 




judges and the deficiencies of ex gratia and statutory compensation schemes, will often be the injured 
party’s remaining option for effective redress. Finally, I will examine the reasoning in some leading 
authorities against the background of underenforcement theory. This examination will test the 
proposition that the main judicial concerns often relate, not to the meanings or conceptual limits of the 
relevant norms, values, or rights, but, rather, to apprehended impacts on the judiciary of the provision 
of an effective remedy. It will be argued that underenforcement theory can perform a valuable 
interpretive role in relation to the decisions. However, it does not validate a position that is essentially 
defensive. The mischief to be resisted is the incidence of a “remedial shortfall”. Where such a shortfall 
cannot otherwise be avoided, a constrained primary state liability would provide a solution.  
 
II. UNDERENFORCEMENT THEORY 
 
Sager, writing on federal US constitutional law, referred to a “gap between the Constitution proper and 
the adjudicated constitution.”11 He questioned the tendency to consider a judicial finding that a certain 
construct does not extend “to certain official behaviour because of institutional concerns rather than 
analytical perceptions” as a “statement about the meaning of the norm in question”.
12
 In his view, all 
that is decided “in such a case is that there are good reasons for stopping short of exhausting the 
content” of the norm that the court is dealing with. Thus, the “limited judicial construct” that the court 
has accepted derives from the court’s determination, rather than “from a judgment about the scope” of 
the concept itself. According to Sager; 
 
“Constitutional norms should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, 
and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as 
delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm. By “legally 
valid,” I mean that the unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have the full status 
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 Lawrence Gene Sager, Justice in Plainclothes, 86 (emphasis added). 
12




of positive law which we generally accord to the norms of our constitution, save only that the 
federal judiciary will not enforce these margins. Thus, the legal powers or legal obligations of 
government officials which are subtended in the unenforced margins of underenforced 




Sager saw the idea of a “constitutional division of labour” as essential to the underenforcement thesis. 
For him, this means that when institutional concerns constrain the judicial branch from fully enforcing 
a constitutional norm, the assistance of other governmental actors ought to be sought to realise “more 
fully the Constitution’s aims”.
14
 He considered that “institutional” reasons for underenforcement of a 
concept relate to questions of “propriety and capacity”, while reasoning “based upon an understanding 
of the concept itself” can be termed as “analytical”.
15
 In this context, it would be “perverse to 
constitutional values to transfer the institutional limitations of the judiciary onto Congress under 
circumstances where to do so would be to guarantee a remedial shortfall”.
16
 Sager also explored the 
notion of “deference” in the context of underenforcement, noting that judges “routinely” sanction 
legislation that they would otherwise regard as unconstitutional if they were not constrained by their 
role. Such deference, he said, is “largely if not exclusively driven by the Court’s view of its own 
institutional limitations, not by its analysis of the substantive requirements of the Constitution”.
17
 In 
Sager’s view, distinguishing between the adjudicated Constitution and the full Constitution enhances 
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While writing primarily in the context of US constitution law, Sager proposed that observation of the 
distinction which he highlighted “is not unique to constitutional law but is applicable to normative 
systems or propositions in general”.
19
 This is important for the purposes of this article, for the 
distinction may equally be applied to the norms and rights at the core of the present discussion. 
According to Sager, the distinction “is based upon the difference between the meaning of a normative 
precept and the application of that precept through the modeling of a theory or structure of analysis, 
and is sometimes expressed by calling the statement of meaning a concept and the statement of 
application a conception.”20 Sager said that we can “explain and justify some forms of apparent 
‘slippage’ between a constitutional norm and its enforcement” by the distinction that one can draw 
“between a conception and its parent concept”, and that it is possible to “agree as to the abstract 
meaning - the concept - of a norm, yet disagree markedly over the conception which ought to be 




Underenforcement theory has been applied to different areas of law, including various aspects of US 
Federal constitutional law
22




, good faith in contracts,
25
 and 
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 See eg, H.J. Powell, “Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law” (2011) 86 Wash L. Rev., 217, 234; E.A. Young, “Popular Constitutionalism and 
the Underenforcement Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law” (2012) 75 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 157-201; G.B. Lee, “First Amendment Enforcement in Government 
Institutions and Programs” (2009) 56 U.C.L.A. L. Rev., 1691-1774; SF Ross, “Legislative 






 but is yet to be engaged in respect of the appropriate response to the harmful 
consequences of judicial errors. For present purposes, its potential application emerges from the view 
that, while common law judges may generally agree as to the abstract meaning – the concept of the 
norm that every injury to rights ought to attract effective legal redress, and of core common law values 
such as ubi ius and the rule of law, they tend to “disagree markedly over the conception which ought 
to be adopted to realise” those concepts. Particularly, there exists a marked difference of opinion on 
the appropriateness of state liability as a remedy for injuries occasioned by judicial acts. Ultimately, it 
appears that the differences of opinion mainly rest on the weight accorded to institutional concerns.  
 
These differences will be examined in detail later; but I will address what purpose underenforcement 
theory can serve here. The pertinent question is how common law decisions that go against current 
trends in international and regional courts can objectively be justified. It would not suffice simply to 
state that this is the approach which the courts have chosen. Possible justifications for the failure to 
hold someone legally liable for irreversible injuries arising from judicial action in circumstances 
wherein the judicial officers themselves enjoy immunity include alternative remedies such as appeals 
and compensation schemes. Where such alternatives are deficient (eg, because availability is too 
constrained or is subject to executive discretions or the damage already suffered cannot be undone) 
underenforcement theory, which postulates that it is sometimes right to not provide a judicial remedy 
may still provide justification. Sager has referred to a proposition that institutional concerns can justify 
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 R.M. Gold, “Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s Role” (2014) 47 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev., 1591-1665. 
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the courts’ retreat from enforcing certain rights.
27
 This is acceptable in principle, but it cannot be that 
every incident of underenforcement is appropriate, or that every constitutional norm, value or right can 
appropriately be underenforced. Arguably, institutional concerns should not override core 
values/norms or fundamental rights. Therefore, whether underenforcement theory provides the 
necessary justification for judicial reticence will depend partly on whether the relevant norms are 
suitable for underenforcement in the particular (or under any) circumstances.  
  
Sager’s theory rejects a “remedial shortfall”. In Sager’s view, where federal courts choose to 
underenforce a norm, Congress and state courts must still be allowed to enforce it.
28
 I construe this as 
indicating that, so long as there is a state actor that will enforce a constitutional norm to its conceptual 
limits, it does not matter that it is being underenforced by one part of the state apparatus. This is 
inherent in Sager’s “constitutional division of labour”, which I will call “the state partnership theory”. 
It follows that there is a major problem where nobody is fully enforcing the norm. My contention here 
is that underenforcement theory will not provide the required justification where the relevant 
norm/right/value is not suited for underenforcement or where the outcome of its underenforcement is a 
remedial shortfall. Such a shortfall is not countenanced by Sager, who expects Congress and state 
courts (ie, other competent state actors) to fill in any shortfalls created by the federal judiciary’s 
underenforcement of constitutional norms. Therefore, where there is no-one to fill in any shortfalls (ie, 
where the state partnership theory is unrealisable) the norm ought not to be underenforced. 
 
The next section will examine the potential of a statutory compensation scheme to avoid remedial 
shortfalls.  
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III. STATUTORY COMPENSATION IS INSUFFICIENT 
 
Article 2(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) requires State 
parties to “ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in 
an official capacity”. Article 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) is presented in similar terms. These represent global and regional 
articulations of ubi ius. Such clauses draw attention to the meaning of “effective remedy” for 
violations by persons acting in an “official capacity”, particularly when the “official capacity” relates 
to an exercise of judicial power. The question “what happens when courts get it wrong?” has long 
beset the common law. Instinctively, one would consider the possibilities of appellate or other 
review.
29
 These would often constitute effective redress – specifically, where no damage has yet 
occurred; but there are situations wherein damage has occurred which review cannot undo. Under the 
common law, there would almost always be no remedy against judges or jurors personally. This is the 
result of judicial immunity.
30
 So who does the aggrieved party pursue for an effective remedy? By 
“effective” I mean that the consequences of the error are addressed practically. 
 
In some situations, statutory compensation may be available. Article 14(6) of the ICCPR, mandating 
such compensation, provides; 
 
“When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when 
subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a 
new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, 
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 See eg, s.9(1) HRA 1998. 
30
 See generally, Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (Clarendon 




the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated 
according to law ...” 
 
The ECHR has a similarly-worded provision.
31
 The phrase “according to law” in this context relates to 
statutory
32
 (or, less satisfactorily, ex gratia
33
) compensation schemes (which tend to attract low 
payouts
34
); but there is no reason why implementation cannot also come via judicial decision-making.  
 
The restriction to criminal cases is significant. Omission of civil cases may arise from (false) 
assumptions, that judicial errors in civil cases can be corrected by appeal/review and will therefore not 
cause irreparable loss/injury, or, that miscarriages of justice do not occur in civil cases, or, that if they 
occur, their impacts are not devastating. The first assumption would ring false when dealing with 
decisions of apex courts. The second assumption may, depending on the definition of “miscarriage of 
justice”, ring false, because denials of fair hearing and violations of due process can occur as much in 
civil cases as in criminal cases. With respect to the third, it can hardly be claimed that a person’s life 
cannot be ruined, or future irreparably compromised, by a decision in a civil case.
35
 Nevertheless, this 
remedy will be approached on its own terms. It is notable that the remedy is circumscribed, being 
restricted to punishments resulting from criminal convictions overturned because there was a 
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 Article 3 of Protocol 7 (which the UK has not ratified). 
32
 See eg, Lord Steyn in R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 18; 
[2005] 1 A.C. 1, [27]-[28]; Lord Hope in R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18, 
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 See eg, Lord Hope in Adams [2011] UKSC 18, [73]. 
34
 See eg, A. Hoel, “Compensation for Wrongful Conviction” (Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice Research Paper No.356, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2008). 
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“miscarriage of justice”. While few would reject the notion of compensation for victims of a 
miscarriage of justice, as will be seen, the statutory compensation schemes intended to implement this 
remedy can be subject to exacting qualifying conditions and executive discretions.  
 
Section 133 of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 1988 was enacted to implement Art.14(6) of the 
ICCPR.
36
 The language of s.133(1) of the Act mirrors Art.14(6). Significantly, a 2014 amendment to 
the Act (s.133(1ZA)) narrowly defines “miscarriage of justice” as happening “if and only if the new or 
newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”. 
The impact of this amendment is that many who have “suffered punishment” due to wrongful 
convictions will not benefit from s.133. Even before s.133(1ZA), the Supreme Court had adopted in 
Adams a narrow definition of the term, accepting only two out of four categories that it could possibly 
cover. Lord Phillips PSC enumerated the four categories, and subsequently refined them.
37
 Lord 
Dyson MR later thus described the four categories (of which only the first two qualified); 
 
“(1) where the fresh evidence shows clearly that the defendant is innocent of the crime of 
which he has been convicted … (2) where the fresh evidence so undermines the evidence 
against the defendant that no conviction could possibly be based upon it;  (3) where the fresh 
evidence renders the conviction unsafe in that, had it been available at the time of the trial, a 
reasonable jury might or might not have convicted the defendant; and (4) where something has 
gone seriously wrong in the investigation of the offence or the conduct of the trial, resulting in 
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 Compare s.23 of the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) Human Rights Act 2004. 
37
 [2011] UKSC 18, [9] (citing Dyson L.J. in the Court of Appeal). 
38
 Lord Dyson M.R. in R (Nealon) v Secretary of State for Justice; R (Hallam) v Secretary of State for 




Clearly, some whose convictions are quashed would fall within the third or fourth scenarios. The 
subsequent definition in s.133(1ZA) rejects even the second scenario. This restricted definition is 
apparently not contrary to Art.6(2) of the ECHR because, according to R (Adams) v Secretary of State 
for Justice,39 Art.6(2) does not apply to s.133, whatever definition of ‘miscarriage of justice’ is 
adopted.  
 
Recent case law further demonstrates the difficulties with this kind of scheme. In R v Nealon40 the 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (“CCRC”), under s.9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, quashed the conviction of the 
appellant, who had been convicted of attempted rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequent 
DNA evidence had, while not ruling out the possibility that the appellant had committed the offence, 
cast doubt on the safety of his conviction, “because it might reasonably have led the jury to reach a 
different verdict”.
41
 Mr Nealon had by this time spent 17 years in prison. In R v Hallam42 the Court, 
under a similar reference, quashed the conviction of the appellant for murder, conspiracy to commit 
grievous bodily harm and violent disorder. The appellant had, throughout the trial, relied on an alibi. 
Subsequent fresh evidence cast doubt on the safety of the conviction, but the Court doubted whether 
the circumstances “could ever have established … positive evidence that the appellant was not at the 
scene”.
43
 Mr Hallam had been imprisoned at the age of 17, and had spent 7 years in prison.  
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The Secretary of State refused the claims of these individuals for compensation. In Nealon and 
Hallam44, the Divisional Court rejected a claim that this decision was incompatible with Art.6(2) 
ECHR, and an appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal
45
 failed. According to Lord Dyson 
M.R., s.133 is not incompatible with Art.6(2) because s.133 “does not require the applicant to prove 
his innocence generally”.46 In his view, 
 
“The focus on the effect of that new or newly discovered fact (rather than on whether the 
person can demonstrate innocence generally) is central to the operation of section 133.  The 
fact that the Secretary of State is not persuaded beyond reasonable doubt by a new or newly 
discovered fact that an applicant is innocent does not entail that the Secretary of State casts 
doubt on his innocence generally.  He is merely saying that the applicant’s innocence has not 
been proved by the new or newly discovered fact.”47 
 
This is an unhappy focus on what is provable by new facts, especially given the view that ‘in most 
cases, it is virtually impossible to pinpoint the “wrongly convicted innocent”’.
48
 Furthermore, it is 
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 R (Nealon) v Secretary of State for Justice; R (Hallam) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 
EWHC 1565 (Admin); [2015] All E.R. (D) 84; and this despite the decision of the ECtHR in Allen v 
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46
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 S. Poyser and R. Milne, “No grounds for complacency and plenty for continued vigilance: 




unclear how one would prove a negative, much less to do so beyond reasonable doubt. Finally, it 
might be thought odd to require new facts to prove something that has long been presumed (ie, that an 
accused did not commit any offence, unless the state can prove otherwise). Thus, under the UK’s 
statutory compensation scheme, those who had already served terms of imprisonment by virtue of 
convictions that were subsequently quashed for being unsafe had no redress for the terms of 
imprisonment already served. This results ultimately from a flawed statutory definition of 
“miscarriage of justice”
49
; but, even before that there was an equally problematic judicial definition. 
The Nealon and Hallam litigation exposes the difficulties arising when someone suffers irreparable 
damage due to judicial error. What was at issue was a statutory scheme to compensate a selection of 
such injured persons. The highly restrictive nature of the scheme reveals that the state (personified 
here by the executive and legislature) is not prepared to provide redress for many who have suffered 
loss when something has gone badly wrong in the judicial process. One possible deduction is that the 
executive and legislature cannot be trusted to serve as keen protectors, either of those injured by the 
judicial system, or of important common law norms and values. The state partnership theory begins to 
crumble in practice, and the state may well be failing in its performance of the duty referred to by 
Marshall C.J. in Marbury v Madison, and articulated by Art.2(3)(a) of the ICCPR and Art 13 of the 
ECHR. That claimants in most of the UK “are now dependent solely upon the scheme provided by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
[2015] Police Journal, 265, 266 (internal citations omitted). Generally, L. Weathered, “The Growing 
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37(1) U.N.S.W. L.J. 376; G. Hammond, “The New Miscarriages of Justice” (2006) 14 Waikato L.Rev. 
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U.N.S.W. L.J. 270. 
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statute” has rightly been described by Lord Hope in Adams as “unfortunate”.50 Parliament’s restrained 
approach to the UK’s international obligations is as manifest here as it is in respect of remedies for 
judicial wrongs under s.9 of the HRA 1998. According to Taylor, ultimately, “the courts are in an 
unenviable position—that of seeking to provide clarity to a scheme that lacks a basis in principle and 




In sum, the statutory scheme is too constrained. Being confined to criminal cases, and with a 
restrictive definition of “miscarriage of justice”, it redresses no remedial shortfall in civil cases, while 
leaving much scope for remedial shortfalls in criminal cases. This flawed implementation of the 
ICCPR/ECHR largely renders nugatory the intended remedy. The situation would be much improved 
were “miscarriage of justice” construed to include all breaches of natural justice (including violations 
of “fair hearing” clauses such as under Art.6 ECHR or Art.14 ICCPR). But it may be that those who 
complain of denials of fair hearing should simply ignore the common law and invoke the ECHR. 
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One commentator has said in respect of the s.133 definition and the Nealon and Hallam litigation: “It 
is hard to think of a more vindictive piece of legislation and, if the challenge [against the decision of 
the Secretary of State] fails, it will close off the possibility for compensation for nearly all victims of 
miscarriages of justice.”
52
 Whether or not one agrees with the view that the legislation is “vindictive”, 
the challenge indeed failed, and the question is whether “the possibility for compensation” has been 
closed off “for nearly all victims of miscarriages of justice”. Clearly, the requirement for an effective 
remedy under Art.2(3) of the ICCPR and Art.13 of the ECHR must still apply when the statutory 
remedy is unavailable. There remains one possibility for such a remedy – one provided by the courts.  
 
IV. STATE LIABILITY – A JUDICIAL REMEDY? 
 
It may be fortuitous that fundamental rights instruments tend to entrust the protection of those whose 
rights have been violated to judicial bodies. Typical is Art.6 of the ECHR. There has been talk of “the 
strong sense shared by [some Irish] judges that the courts should be proactive in protecting rights 
against the legislature and the executive”.
53
 While the presence of such strong judicially shared sense 
in the UK is debateable in the context of the legislature, UK courts can be robust in their protections 
against executive action. But what happens when the defender of rights becomes the (unwitting) 
violator or the authoriser of the violation of rights? I have examined briefly the strictness of the UK’s 
statutory compensation scheme as an engine for redressing irreparable injuries from judicial errors. 
Because the scheme is subject to executive discretion, the applicant is not entitled as of right to a legal 
remedy.
54
 Additionally, such schemes do not extend to civil cases, with all that this implies. For the 
                                                          
52
 J. Robins, “Friend or foe?” 165 N.L.J. 7652, p.6 (15 May 2015). 
53
 W. Binchy, “Meskell, the Constitution and tort law” (2011) 33 Dublin University Law Journal 339-
368, 340. 
54
 See eg, Lord Phillips in R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18, [36], [46]; Lord 




injured party seeking an effective remedy through the courts, the only viable defendant is “the state” 
or (in the UK and parts of the Commonwealth) “the Crown”.
55
 For the purposes of potential liability, I 
will use the term “the state” to include the Crown. The state is an obvious candidate to be pursued 
because the judiciary is a branch of the state, exercising the state’s judicial power. In some 
jurisdictions, this is explicit in the constitution.
56
 Explicit or not, it is a settled constitutional principle. 
It has been pointed out that “State liability for judicial decisions in European Union (EU) and 
international law has its origin in the perception of the state as a single entity or unity”, and that “in 
both legal systems, the conduct of all state branches is therefore attributed to the state in an 
undifferentiated manner”.
57
 So, on one view, judicially mandated wrongs are wrongs committed by the 
state. This is controversial
58
, and common law jurisdictions have responded variously thereto. A recent 
example is the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Attorney-General v 
Chapman59, about which much will be said later. While the idea of state liability for the injurious 
exercise of the judicial power is strongly contested among common law judges, such liability is not 
new. It is well established in civil law countries,
60
 in international law
61
, in the jurisprudence of the 
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ECJ/Court of Justice of the European Union,
62
 (CJEU) and in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
63
 The 
relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU has been embraced by the Caribbean Court of Justice.
64
 Yet, many 





 or the Republic of Ireland.
67
 Its availability in the UK is severely restricted.
68
 In the latter 
two jurisdictions, injured parties will often have to seek relief from the ECtHR. 
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The general common law approach is to preserve the common law sovereign/state immunities.
69
 Since 
some of the main common law immunities themselves stand on contestable foundations,
70
 this default 
position is unfortunate, and it is questionable whether it remains appropriate, if it ever was. Common 
law immunities, when waived by statute,
71
 tend to be subject to exceptions or restrictions relating to 
judicial acts.
72
 Such legislative endeavours may, as has been mooted earlier, simply present 
governments as unreliable protectors/enforcers of important common law values; or they may 
represent executive/legislative deference to the judiciary on account of the judiciary’s constitutional 
role. Such deference would evince the state partnership theory. 
 
New rights bills sometimes trigger debates about state liability for violations of those bills.
73
 The 
discussion that follows will first examine common law decisions showing a positive attitude toward 
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state liability, followed by the decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Chapman.74 The main 
object of this examination is to evaluate the impact of institutional concerns on the outcomes. Here, 
rather than focusing primarily on the judiciary’s perceptions of its own limitations, I bring within 
Sager’s concept of “institutional concerns” situations in which courts seem as concerned about the 
impact of a decision on the judiciary as an institution as they are about the conceptual meanings and 
scopes of the legal norms at issue. References hereafter to “institutional concerns” should be so 
construed. I also note and rely on the proposition, supported at the highest judicial levels, that 
principles of fundamental rights protection are embedded within the common law
75
, such that rights 
declarations such as the ECHR have added little thereto, other than perhaps to protect them from 
legislative encroachment. My point here is that rights bills are mainly declaratory and protective rather 
than originative of the relevant fundamental rights. 
 
The decision of the Privy Council in Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2)76 
(“Maharaj”) exemplifies common law support for primary state liability. The appellant had been 
committed to (and had served a term of) 7 days imprisonment for contempt of court, in circumstances 
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deemed by the Privy Council to constitute a failure of fundamental justice. The Privy Council (Lord 
Hailsham dissenting) held that he had been deprived of his liberty without due process of law and was 
therefore entitled to redress from the state under s.6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago. Lord 
Diplock, delivering the majority opinion, focused on the need to provide an effective remedy. He 
observed that the s.6 remedy, described as “redress”, bore its ordinary meaning, ie, reparation of, 
satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss resulting therefrom.
77
 Since the 
appellant had already served his sentence by the time the case reached the Court of Appeal in 
Trinidad, his right not to be deprived of his liberty without due process had already been violated, and 
the only practicable way of redressing it was by monetary compensation. The state was an appropriate 
defendant because the claim for redress under s.6(1) in respect of judicial action was “a claim against 
the state for what has been done in the exercise of the judicial power of the state”.
78
 This was a 
primary liability of the state.  
 
Lord Diplock did also address some institutional concerns, emphasising that there was no change in 
the principles of judicial immunity. The issue of potential floodgates was disposed of by the view that 
no constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom is contravened by a judgment or order that is wrong 
and liable to be set aside on appeal, or by an error of fact or substantive law, even where the error has 
resulted in a person serving a sentence of imprisonment. The remedy for these kinds of error is to 
appeal.
79
 It is noteworthy for the purposes of the coming analysis that this view reveals the constrained 
nature of the remedy being provided – ie, it did not provide a carte blanche of state liability. 
According to Lord Diplock, the types of judicial error that would amount to a contravention of the 
right to due process are procedural errors that amount to a failure to observe one of the fundamental 
rules of natural justice.
80
 In his view, such cases would be rare, and even in such rare cases, s.6 of the 
                                                          
77 
[1979] A.C. 385, 398. 
78
 [1979] A.C. 385, 399. 
79 
[1979] A.C. 385, 399. 
80




constitution would not be engaged unless the situation has resulted, is resulting or is likely to result, in 
a person being deprived of life, liberty, security of the person, or enjoyment of property.81 According 
to Lord Diplock, it is “only in the case of imprisonment or corporal punishment already undergone 
before an appeal can be heard that the consequences of the judgment or order cannot be put right on 
appeal to an appellate court”.
82
 While the last statement is appropriate in the context of Maharaj itself, 
as will presently appear, it is an over-simplification as a general statement, since (inter alia) 
“enjoyment of property” should be included. 
 
Maharaj provides a practicable model and a clear juristic basis for state liability, ie, that it is a primary 
public law liability of the state for the wrongful exercise of its own judicial power. It may be argued 
that this decision simply effectuates a specific constitutional provision (s.6 of the Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago), and therefore could not be of wider application.
83
 The weakness of such a 
contention lies in the argument that s.6 did not create a new norm, but simply articulated ubi ius. The 
same can be said for similar clauses in the ICCPR, ECHR, and other rights instruments expressly 
providing redress for rights violations. And where there is no expression provision, it should be 
considered implicit in the rights declarations that their violations must be remedied effectively. 
Therefore, in the absence of clear statutory provisions to the contrary, there is no reason why Maharaj 
should not be embraced. It clearly undermines the case for underenforcement in cases of irreparably 
injurious judicial errors. Lord Hailsham (dissenting) likewise focused mainly on analytical concerns - 
the nature of the rights at issue, and whether the legislature had, by s.6, improved on the rights 
guaranteed by the constitution to provide a remedy where none existed before, but took the view that 
s.6 had not provided such a right.
84
 It is however noteworthy that he also alluded to the floodgates 
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 The floodgates argument has long been discredited
86
 and presents no convincing basis for 
underenforcement. But even if any floodgates were likely to be opened, the statement of Holt CJ in 
Ashby v White that “it is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of action; for if men will 
multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too”
87
 provides a full response.  
 
In R v Germain88 the Alberta Queen’s Bench court supported the Maharaj type of state liability in 
cases of infringements of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. McDonald J accepted the 
views of Lord Diplock in Maharaj concerning the public law liability of the state “as being an apt 
description of the juristic nature of the liability that may be imposed upon the state under s.24(1) [of 
the Charter] in the form of an order of monetary compensation”.
89
 R v Germain has (often along with 
Maharaj) been cited with approval in Canada.90 For example, the court in R v Rudko91 agreed in 
principle that “an order for compensation could be issued against the Crown”
92
, but did not consider 
                                                          
85 [1979] A.C. 385, 406. 
86
 It has been described as an “expression of alarm”, that cannot “withstand any reasoned scrutiny” - 
see eg, R. Anand, “Damages for Unconstitutional Actions: A Rule in Search of a Rationale” (2010) 
National Journal of Constitutional Law 159, 170. See also H. Watchirs and G. McKinnon, “Five 
Years’ Experience of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): Insights for Human Rights Protection in 
Australia” (2010) 33 (1) U.N.S.W. L.J. 136, 145-147, 155. 
87
 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955; 92 E.R. 126, 136. 
88 
(1984) 53 A.R. 2d. 264 (Q.B., Alberta). 
89
 (1984) 53 A.R. 2d. 264, 275. 
90
 See eg, Oag v R (1985) 22 C.R.R. 171 (Federal Court, Trial Division); Royer v Mignault (1988) 50 
D.L.R. (4th) 345; 32 C.R.R. 1 (C.A., Quebec); Prefontaine v Gosman [2000] 6 W.W.R. 530; 270 A.R. 
97 (Q.B., Alberta); R v Rudko (1999) 252 A.R. 142; 68 C.R.R. (2d) 98 (Q.B., Alberta). 
91
 (1999) 252 A.R. 142. 
92




such an order appropriate in the particular case. Nevertheless, it appears that the matter of state 




In Baigent’s Case94 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the Crown was a proper defendant in 
cases of violations of the Bill of rights Act 1990 (“BORA”), and that this was a direct, rather than 
vicarious, cause of action against the Crown. An award of damages would be an available remedy. It 
was held that it was implicit in the legislation that there was a public law cause of action against the 
Crown, which was untouched by the immunities for vicarious liability in tort. This decision came up 
for discussion in Attorney-General v Chapman.95 Mr Chapman was convicted and sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment for sexual offences against a child. His claim for legal aid to prosecute his appeal was 
refused and his appeal was dismissed without an oral hearing. The procedures applied in his appeal 
were subsequently declared by the Privy Council unlawful and in violation of the BORA. He was 
granted a new appeal, which, with the benefit of legal aid, resulted in his convictions being quashed 
and a retrial being ordered. Pending the retrial, he was released on bail. The retrial was ultimately 
abandoned, because the original complainant, now 16 years old, was unwilling to endure another trial 
and give evidence in person. Mr Chapman was thereupon discharged under s.347 of the Crimes Act 
1961. He subsequently instituted a claim against the Attorney-General for public law compensation for 
breach of his rights to an appeal and to natural justice under s.25 and s.27 of the BORA.  
 
The New Zealand Supreme Court (Elias C.J. and Anderson J. dissenting) rejected the claim. The 
majority judgment was delivered by McGrath and William Young JJ. (hereafter referred to as “the 
Court”), with Gault J. delivering a brief concurring judgment. The Court accepted that the dismissal of 
Mr Chapman’s appeal by the Court of Appeal via the ex parte procedure was in breach of his rights to 
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an appeal and to natural justice, and noted that the issue now was whether his claim “is precluded by 
the same principles which would exclude a direct claim by Mr Chapman against the judges who dealt 
with his case”.
96
 The Court did not consider that Baigent’s Case and other New Zealand cases 
established “that public law compensation can be sought from the Attorney-General for judicial 
breaches” of the BORA, but recognised that Maharaj supported Mr Chapman’s legal arguments. 
Nevertheless the Court did not consider this “as being of controlling significance”, because “the reality 
is that the case also turns on a policy judgment”, because there was an issue of judicial immunity, 





V. UNDERENFORCEMENT AND DENIALS OF A JUDICIAL REMEDY 
 
The reasoning of the majority in Attorney-General v Chapman is characteristic of those underlying 
judicial denials of a remedy against the state, and this discussion approaches it as such. The Irish High 
Court’s decision in Kemmy v Ireland98 is also notable in this respect – but, Chapman, as an apex court 
decision, will be the focus of this section, which will seek to demonstrate that the arguments against 
state liability typically focus less on the analytical case for effective redress, and more on institutional 
concerns.  
 
The Court noted in Chapman99 that the Court of Appeal had rejected submissions by the Solicitor 
General “that the proper remedy for judicial error in the criminal process is judicial correction within 
the criminal process itself and that there can be no further review by way of civil proceedings for 
compensation”, and had “proceeded on the basis that the judiciary were as much subject to the Bill of 
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Rights Act as the Executive and that there was no exception for judicial acts”. Also noted was the 
Court of Appeal’s reliance on Baigent’s Case and subsequent New Zealand cases, Maharaj, Art.2(3) 
of the ICCPR, and “the international law principle under which a state is responsible for the actions of 
all branches of government including the judiciary”.
100
 The Court also noted
101
 that the Court of 
Appeal had accepted the argument that the compensation remedy, as outlined in Baigent’s case, is 
properly characterised as a direct public law remedy available against the state, that it is “not a remedy 
against the Crown narrowly defined as constituting only the Executive branch of government”, and 
that, as “the first law officer of the Crown, the Attorney-General is the obvious defendant”. The 
conceptual/analytical issues were thus clearly before the Court. Predictably, so were the institutional 
concerns. The Court of Appeal had also taken the view that there was no threat to judicial 




On the Court of Appeal’s reliance on Baigent’s Case, the Supreme Court adopted the narrow approach 
that Baigent’s Case “only involved breaches of rights by the police”, and that “the general language 
used by the other three judges would not be taken as having wider application than to breaches by the 
executive branch”.
103
 Thus, the wide principle claimed to have been established by Baigent’s Case was 
“obiter on the point and the view of a single judge”.
104
 It was not necessary for the court in Baigent’s 
Case to address breaches of rights resulting from judicial acts, and judicial breaches “raise particular 
constitutional questions relating to judicial independence which did not arise in the context of the 
police actions being considered in Baigent’s Case”.105 However, it should be noted that the Court of 
Appeal was concerned with the issue of redress for wrongs committed by state actors, which include 
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the judicial branch. Its focus was therefore rightly on the substantive questions relating to provision of 
effective redress against state violations of the BORA.   
 
The Supreme Court’s assault on Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) were, 
with respect, equally unconvincing. On Maharaj, the Court noted106 the differences between the 
human rights provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and those of the BORA, but 
rightly did not see those differences as a basis for distinguishing Maharaj. The Court accepted that 
Maharaj provides some support for Mr Chapman’s arguments, but said that there were “issues as to 
how substantial that support is”.
107
 Following a detailed analysis of the factual circumstances of 
Maharaj, the Court said that the majority in Maharaj had distinguished ‘between correctable errors of 
fact, law and even jurisdiction for which public law compensation could not be sought and breaches of 
“fundamental rules of natural justice” for which a claim could be made against the state’.
108
 It however 
felt that there was no obvious rational basis for determining how a particular error should be classified. 
But it has been seen earlier that Maharaj clearly provided such a basis; and the rules of natural justice 
are not alien to common law courts. Additionally, Mr Maharaj was seeking to enforce his right not to 
be deprived of liberty without due process. It was therefore appropriate for the Privy Council to focus 
on the question whether there had been (and what constitutes) a failure of due process, even if 
described as a “failure of fundamental justice”.  
 
The Court proceeded to review the considerations for and against state liability for judicial breaches of 
the Bill of Rights Act. It considered the principle of judicial immunity and the policy considerations 
underlying it, and observed that the New Zealand Law Commission had recommended that the same 
absolute immunity rule be applied to district court judges as the higher courts.
109
 Parliament had 
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implemented this recommendation, but “did not adopt the further recommendation that legislation 
explicitly provide that a remedy for breach of rights not be available in respect of judicial conduct” – 
which simply meant that “Parliament has left it to the courts to decide whether the remedy is available 
for those breaches”.110 The emphasised part of this statement is crucial. The New Zealand Law 
Commission’s reasons were mainly institutional,
111
 although, interestingly, the relevant 
recommendation was not extended to errors of some inferior courts. The New Zealand Parliament 
deliberately chose to defer to the judiciary on this issue. Presumably, it did not consider the 
institutional concerns raised on behalf of the judiciary by the Law Commission so crucial that it should 
legislate to block all avenues of redress. And, presumably, this deference to the judiciary constitutes 
recognition that the courts are the ultimate protectors of individual rights. Sager’s view that it would 
be “perverse to constitutional values to transfer the institutional limitations of the judiciary onto 
Congress under circumstances where to do so would be to guarantee a remedial shortfall”
112
 has been 
referred to earlier. Similarly, it may be that capitulation to the judiciary’s institutional concerns, where 
to do so would “guarantee a remedial shortfall” would be “perverse to constitutional values”. The New 
Zealand Parliament must be commended for not accepting such transfer of the judiciary’s institutional 
concerns to itself. Parliament’s rejection of the Law Commission’s proposal presented the courts with 
an opportunity, free of legislative shackles, for effective enforcement of the BORA tights and the 
norms requiring an effective remedy. The Chapman court however squandered the opportunity. 
 
The Court noted that the Crown is not vicariously liable for the actions of judges.
113
 It accepted that 
judicial immunity is not itself fatal to the claim against the state for breaches of the BORA, since 
Baigent’s Case decided that “the liability of the Crown being direct, statutory immunities applying to 
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the individuals involved were not an answer to the claim”.
114
 But it regarded as fundamental the issue 
of whether the BORA, and the courts’ duty to fashion remedies identified in Baigent’s Case enable 
such a direct action to be brought for breaches of protected rights by judges.
115
 The Court also 
evaluated the policy justifications for judicial immunity alongside the considerations in Baigent’s 
Case,116 including finality in litigation, judicial independence, the existence within the justice system 
of adequate rights of appeal, rehearing and review, the establishment of the Supreme Court, New 
Zealand’s reservation to Art.14(6) of the ICCPR, and the institution of a compensation scheme to deal 
with exceptional cases.
117
 It concluded that “the public policy reasons which support personal judicial 
immunity also justify confining the scope of Crown liability for governmental breaches of the BORA 




There is much to criticise in the Court’s reasoning, and not just because of its undue focus on 
institutional concerns; but it will suffice to refer to Elias CJ’s dissent, which highlights some of the 
criticisms. Significantly, the arguments of the majority did not persuade the Elias C.J., who could be 
expected to be adequately informed about the potential practical and political ramifications of the 
institutional concerns expressed. Elias C.J. started by noting that “A right without a remedy ‘is a vain 
thing to imagine”’
119
 and noted that the fact “that rights are vindicated through remedy for breach is 
fundamental to the rule of law.” For her, the issue in the case was “whether New Zealand domestic 
law prevents damages being awarded, when they would afford effective remedy, if the breach of rights 
is caused by judicial action”.
120
 After referring to the direct public law liability of the state established 
                                                          
114
 [2011] NZSC 110, [176]. 
115
 [2011] NZSC 110, [178]. 
116
 [2011] NZSC 110, [178]-[179]. 
117
 [2011] NZSC 110, [193]-[200]. 
118
 [2011] NZSC 110, [204]. Compare Kemmy v Ireland [2009] IEHC 178, [74]. 
119
 [2011] NZSC 110, [1], referring to Holt C.J. in Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953. 
120




in Baigent’s Case, Elias C.J. said that this “direct public law remedy does not substitute the state for 
the public officials who would, in the absence of some form of immunity, otherwise be responsible in 
tort. It is distinct from private law remedies … and is available for denial of rights rather than error in 
result or procedure which can be adequately corrected within the process in which it occurs”.
121
 In her 
view, “The number of cases in which public law damages have been sought from the state since 1994 
is small, suggesting that early predictions of a flood of claims to vex the administration of justice are 
well astray, as such predictions usually are”.
122
 According to her; 
 
“[I]t would be contrary to the scheme and purpose of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act if 
those deprived of rights through judicial action are denied the opportunity to obtain damages 
from the state, where an award of damages is necessary to provide effective remedy. ... A gap 
in remedy for judicial breach is contrary to the obligation of the state to provide effective 
remedy in domestic law. Excluding remedy for judicial breaches would leave a large remedial 
hole because many of the rights affirmed in the Act are afforded principally within judicial 




Elias C.J. is addressing here the spectre of Sager’s “remedial shortfall”. She felt that Maharaj should 
continue to apply in New Zealand because “the approach is consistent with the obligations imposed 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and is supported by international and comparative case 
law”. According to her, “the reasoning adopted by the majority in Baigent’s Case … applies equally to 
acts of the judiciary. Attempts to distinguish Baigent’s Case according to the ratio of the case are 
unconvincing and, in any event, arid”.
124
 She also considered that it had not “been found necessary in 
other comparable jurisdictions where the point has arisen to except judicial breaches from the remedy 
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of damages available against the state”.
125
 On the issue of judicial immunity, Elias C.J. emphasised 
that it is not engaged in the public law liability of the state for breaches of rights.
126
 In her view, while 
it may be that the public interest in judicial immunity outweighs the public interest in effective remedy 
for breach of rights where the two conflict, there was no conflict here. Rather, what was being 




Elias C.J. noted the conflicts of immunities with other important rule of law values, which causes 
immunities to be regarded with suspicion.
128
 She felt that the “immunity” for the state which was 
being suggested in the present case is “in principle inconsistent with the rule of law”, and she did not 
consider that such extension is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. In her view, if 
“exemption from liability is unnecessary, then given the adverse impact on rule of law values in the 
vindication of rights, [it would not] conform with the Bill of Rights Act for such exemption to be 
created by act of the judicial branch of government…”
129
 The logical conclusion of this is evident. 
Parliament refused to create an exemption; the judiciary ought not to create an exemption; therefore, 
an exemption is unwarranted. 
 
Elias C.J. rejected arguments about the alleged negative impacts of state liability on judicial 
independence on account of the reality or perception of executive encroachment on the judicial 
function and a reluctance by judges to risk responsibility for public liability.
130
 She took the view that 
the availability of a Baigent damages remedy against the state is not inconsistent with New Zealand’s 
reservation to Art.14(6) of the ICCPR; a direct public law claim will not “ordinarily offer an 
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alternative means of challenging a conviction or a judicial decision”, and the reservation to Art.14(6) 
“does not therefore inhibit the public law damages remedy recognised in Baigent’s Case”.131 
Objections based on the need to avoid collateral challenges of judicial determinations were dismissed 
as being “overblown”, especially seeing that “the policy behind judicial immunity is seen, 
internationally at least, to be satisfied by the narrower objective of protecting judges from personal 
liability”.
132
 Furthermore, “A blanket exclusion for breach attributable to judicial action also 
overreaches because it prevents a claim for public law damages even if there is no collateral challenge 




VI. UNDERENFORCEMENT AND CONSTRAINED ENFORCEMENT 
 
Judicial attempts to restrict Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) are not new, 
whether on the basis that it was based on a specific provision of the Constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago, with no corresponding local provision,
134
 or on the basis of institutional concerns similar to 
those relied upon by the majority in Attorney-General v Chapman.135 Maharaj and Chapman represent 
respectively the high and low water marks of common law endorsement and rejection of state liability. 
The Maharaj court focused largely on analytical questions. In Chapman, only the dissents focused on 
such questions. The disagreement between the Chapman majority and dissenting opinions centres on 
the weight to be accorded to institutional concerns. This tension is not unusual when rights and 
remedies are being balanced against immunities, and the question for common law judges therefore is 
the proper location of its focus, ie, on the analytical/conceptual or on the institutional. Maharaj 
provides a narrow avenue of judicial redress, while Chapman guarantees a remedial shortfall. 
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According to Woods, the Chapman majority used “a narrow approach to the interpretation of past 
precedent … to set up a blank slate upon which a fairly ‘activist’ case for the imposition of judicial 
immunity is made out”.
136
 In the context of protection of fundamental rights, increasingly recognised 
as rooted in the common law, this is problematic. There were references in Chapman to “the ex gratia 
scheme”
137
 but even the Court recognised that such schemes do “not fill gaps left in the criminal 
justice system by the limits of available remedies”.
138
 Both ex gratia and statutory compensation 
schemes are problematic. While not generally providing legally enforceable rights, they exclude civil 
cases and are subject to executive discretions that may be exercised against the injured party. It has 
rightly been noted that is no good telling the victim “Well, you’re out now. You should just be 
happy”.
139
 But in the absence of an effective remedy, this is precisely what the common law would be 
“telling the victim”. When fundamental rights are at stake, any outcome that guarantees a remedial 
shortfall is objectionable. 
 
Woods accepts the Chapman majority’s approach as representing “a technically correct application of 
precedent” but says that “it remains unsatisfying because it leaves no room for deeper consideration of 
the principles upon which these cases rest”.
140
 According to her, “A more searching consideration of 
the underpinning of the Baigent understanding of public law compensation could have illuminated the 
policy and principles that should underlie the approach to infringements by the judicial branch of 
government too”.
141
 This may just be another way of saying that the majority did not focus sufficiently 
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on analytical and conceptual questions. Sager spoke of the “indicia of underenforcement”
142
, which 
include inter alia “a disparity between the scope of a federal judicial construct and that of plausible 
understandings of the constitutional concept from which it derives”, and the use by judges of “frankly 
institutional explanations” for limiting a judicial construct. The Chapman decision is neither a 
statement about the meaning or conceptual limits of fundamental rights under the BORA, nor about 
the meaning and scope of core common law norms and values such as the rule of law or ubi ius. In 
short, it is a classic underenforcement approach.  
 
It has already been suggested that the majority’s approach in Chapman reflects the typical reasoning 
underlying rejection of state liability for judicial wrongs. To that extent, the criticisms here are not as 
much about Chapman as they are about patterns of judicial underenforcement in this area, for which 
Chapman is a proxy. The question whether these norms, principles or values are appropriate 
candidates for judicial underenforcement is not being addressed directly by the courts, which can 
hardly be blamed when the matter is not presented to them in such terms. Here, I do so present it. 
Perhaps the question posed when considering the irretrievably injurious consequences of judicial 
errors is wrong. The question arguably ought to be whether it is ever (and in what circumstances it is) 
appropriate to underenforce important common law norms and values such as protection of 
fundamental rights, the rule of law, and redress for injuries. I would submit that, while they may be 
appropriately constrained in certain circumstances, they are ill-suited for judicial underenforcement, 
not least because they are foundational to the common law. 
 
The institutional considerations upon which Chapman and similar decisions are based are, with 
respect, laced with conjecture, and are comparable to the justifications for judicial immunity (which 
itself features among the proffered rationales for non-liability of the state) that have been thus 
described; 
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“… virtually all of the reasons that have been invoked in order to justify [judicial immunity] – 
at least in its near-absolute form – are either couched in obviously exaggerated terms (and 




There is no suggestion that there are inherent weaknesses in the common law that render common law 
systems especially vulnerable to floodgates or the like, or that common law jurisdictions are 
particularly litigious, or that common law judges are of diminished personal fortitude in comparison 
with civil law judges. Although Maharaj has been cited with approval, for example, in Canada, and in 
New Zealand before the Supreme Court’s decision in Chapman, there is no indication that any 
common law jurisdiction has experienced floodgates of actions against the state in respect of judicial 
errors. Given that state liability is well established in civil law systems, in international law, in 
European Union law, and in European human rights jurisprudence, it is reasonable to expect that the 




Institutional concerns cannot however simply be dismissed as irrelevant. They feature strongly in the 
Köbler jurisprudence on EU member state liability, supporting an exceptional liability with a high 
threshold. Institutional concerns have been used to support constraints on liability by applying the 
sufficiently serious breach test “in an especially strict manner in respect of judicial decisions”.
145
 
According to Davies, “this means that the conditions for Köbler liability permit the theory of state 
unity to be balanced against other considerations”, whereas “[t]his exercise does not occur in 
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international law where the conditions for state responsibility are the same for all state organs.”
146
 The 
ECtHR also accepted in Ernst v Belgium147 that judicial immunity pursues a legitimate aim148, and that 
immunities are not in themselves necessarily a “disproportionate limitation on the right of access to a 
court as enshrined in Art.6(1)” of the ECHR.
149
 But it also emphasised that it has to judge the 
compatibility of immunities with the Convention by examining whether the affected parties had 
“reasonable alternative remedies available to protect their rights under the Convention effectively.”
150
 
Significantly, the ECtHR held that a person whose claim arising from official action is barred by 
immunities does not suffer discrimination in violation of Art 14 ECHR (coupled with Art 6), as long 
as the right to bring a civil action against the state is retained.
151
 Despite its recognition of judicial 
immunity as pursuing a legitimate aim, the ECtHR still came to the view that searches consequent 
upon judicially authorised search warrants were not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued; thus 
there had been a violation of Article 10
152
 and Article 8
153
 of the ECHR, and awarded damages against 
Belgium. The ECtHR rejected in McFarlane v Ireland154 some of the institutional concerns raised by 
common law courts; 
 
“[T]he Court considers, contrary to the High Court in the Kemmy case, that there is a relevant 
distinction to be drawn between the personal immunity from suit of judges and the liability of 
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the state to compensate an individual for blameworthy [injurious conduct] attributable in 
whole or in part to judges.” 
 
It was held that there had been a breach of Art.6 of the ECHR due to the excessive length of the 
criminal proceedings against the applicant, partly caused by the failure of a judge to deliver judgment 
within a reasonable time, that (because of judicial immunity) Irish law did not provide “effective 
remedies available to the applicant in theory and in practice at the relevant time”
155
, and that there was 
therefore also a breach of Art.13 of the ECHR. These findings resulted in damages being awarded 
against Ireland. 
 
The foregoing reveals that the norms that mandate redress for violations of rights, including judicially 
occasioned violations, are enforced in international law, and under the ECHR, with the state as the 
responsible party. Institutional concerns led the CJEU to accept constraints on state liability, but not to 
deny it. A similar observation can be made in respect of Maharaj decision, the ECtHR, and the 
Chapman minority. Thus institutional concerns are not necessarily fatal to state liability, and should 
not be accorded undue weight. But the reasoning underlying the Chapman majority approach appears 
to give the institutional concerns an almost decisive effect. Sager spoke of a partnership between the 
judiciary and the other branches of government, and, of judicial “deference”. But the other branches 
seem to defer to the judiciary here. When government (or legislature) has deferred to the judiciary (the 
ultimate protector of individual rights) it is unsatisfactory for the judiciary to focus on its own 
institutional concerns, especially where a less defensive response will neither bring it into conflict with 
the other branches, nor take it beyond its proper institutional role. 
 
The approach of the Supreme Court of Canada to the provision of remedies for violations of the 
Canadian Charter are of significant interest. In R v 974649 Ontario Inc., McLachlin C.J. pointed out 
that “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its 
                                                          
155






 Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. explained in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of 
Education) that;  
 
“A purposive approach to remedies in a Charter context gives modern vitality to the ancient 
maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there must be a remedy. More 
specifically, a purposive approach to remedies requires at least two things. First, the purpose 
of the right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive remedies. Second, 





This, with respect, is a laudable approach which other courts could properly follow, even when the 
rights violations come from the judicial branch. This is not judicial activism. Rather, it simply 
represents appropriate recognition of core common law values and norms. 
 
It has rightly been noted that “[c]itizens do not expect to suffer harm as a consequence of unlawful 
action by the courts”
158
, and that injustice “undoubtedly brings about a number of social harms.”
159
 
The question whether anyone should pay for judicial wrongs partly engages what has been described 
as “the age old question: who judges the judges?”
160
 Denials of remedies for injurious violations of 
rights resulting from judicial action has been described as frustrating community and societal 
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 and as undermining the rule of law and the principle of equality before the law.
162
 
Whether or not one agrees with the former, the latter is arguably correct. The idea of state unity is 
established in international law and increasingly in regional courts. States cannot hide behind their 
individual branches such that they can escape liability for the injurious exercise of their sovereign 
power. For example, in Rudisa Beverages & Juices NV and another v State of Guyana, an attempt by 
Guyana to escape liability by pointing to the alleged failures of the legislature to implement the 
executive’s will to comply with treaty obligations was rightly rejected by the Caribbean Court of 
Justice because “[w]hile democratic power is housed in the different arms of the State, the State itself 
is indivisible … a breach committed by any of the branches of the State engages the responsibility of 




VII. CONTROL MECHANISMS 
 
I accept that state liability cannot be at large, and that some control mechanisms are required. First, the 
injurious judicial error must first have been overturned on appeal/review. Next for consideration is the 
kinds of judicial error that may be suitable candidates for state liability. Are all errors the same? The 
answer is obviously “no”. A judicial error may consist of a court answering a question of fact or law 
wrongly. A jury may wrongfully convict a defendant. Judges may exceed their jurisdiction either in 
hearing a case or in its disposition. There may be a violation of a constitutional right. Is it appropriate 
to treat a simple error of fact or law in the same way as a violation of a constitutional right? 
Intuitively, the answer to this question may appear to be “no”, especially seeing that Maharaj v 
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) itself is concerned with constitutional rights. 
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However, simple errors of fact or law, if not caught and corrected in time, have as much potential to 
cause irreparable damage as violations of constitutional rights. Therefore, the answer to the question 
“which kinds of error are the focus?” is that any error that has not yet caused irreparable loss, damage 
or injury is excluded. Thus, any error that can be and has been cured by appellate or other review 
before any loss or damage has occurred is excluded. Lord Hailsham (dissenting) noted in Maharaj164 
that “judicial error is not a tort”. If by this he meant that a judicial error should not, by itself, provide a 
valid cause of action for compensation, then I would respectfully adopt that view. In the context of 
state liability as a residual remedy for judicial errors, it might even be extended to constitutional 
violations and denials of fair hearing (although it is arguable in other contexts that these ought to be 
actionable per se) because a successful appeal or application for judicial review might well constitute 
an appropriate and “effective” remedy.  
 
Clearly, a remedy need not be compensatory/financial to be “effective”. Reputations, for example, can 
be salvaged or restored by quashing of convictions, extraditions can be halted by vacation of decisions 
tainted by bias, etc. The real focus is on situations wherein the error concerned has already caused 
loss, damage or injury that cannot be undone. This was the situation in Maharaj, wherein Lord 
Diplock stated that it is “only in the case of imprisonment or corporal punishment already undergone 
before an appeal can be heard that the consequences of the judgment or order cannot be put right on 
appeal to an appellate court”.
165
 This is one of the two constraints imposed in Maharaj, the second 
being that the types of judicial error that would amount to a contravention of the right to due process 
are procedural errors that amount to a failure to observe one of the fundamental rules of natural 
justice.
166
 The first constraint relates to consequences, while the second relates to the category of error. 
Both constraints were probably appropriate for Maharaj given the constitutional right at issue; but the 
first needs to be moderated as a general principle. For example, a litigant in a civil case can lose much 
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from the judgment of a biased court. If the disqualifying factor emerges after passage of time, it may 
have become impossible to recover the situation. Property may already have been demolished. 
Commercial deals may already have been lost. Businesses may already have been bankrupted. A 
deportee may already have met his doom. An aspirant to political office who lost an election petition 
in an apex court that sat with disqualified judges may have suffered irreparable loss from what would 
have been at best, an unfair hearing, and, at worst, a miscarriage of justice. Subsequent vacations of 
the tainted judgments would not, by themselves, constitute adequate or effective redress, because they 
would not have addressed the consequences of the judicial error. In view of the typical inapplicability 
of statutory compensation schemes to civil suits, and of the principles of judicial immunity, the 
responses of some domestic common law courts would result in a remedial shortfall. Thus, the 
appropriate focus for the control mechanisms, it is submitted, lies in the consequences of judicial error. 
This argument applies equally to civil and criminal cases. 
 
The proposition that, for the purposes of common law state liability, the judicial act must have caused 
irreparable damage, loss, or injury is hard to fault. The difficulty lies in the second Maharaj constraint 
– the types of judicial error. If it is accepted that all kinds of error have the potential to cause 
irreparable injury, then it must also be that the emphasis should not be on the category of error. 
Therefore, if irreparable injury results from judicial error, it should not matter what kind of error 
caused that injury. For this purpose, the second constraint of Maharaj may also need to be moderated 
as a general principle. The category of judicial error should arguably play only a secondary role (if at 
all), because the requirement of irreparable loss/injury/damage already suffered may itself be a 
sufficient constraint and control factor. While this takes matters beyond Maharaj, it is still 
considerably constrained. It is doubtful that this approach would result in more cases than Maharaj has 
generated, meaning that it would not open any floodgates. At the same time, it would address the 
problem of remedial shortfalls, thereby appropriately enforcing ubi ius.  
 
A related question concerns the category of rights. Is liberty more important than, say, property rights, 




the same way as rights under the ECHR, the BORA, or the Canadian (or any other) Charter of Rights? 
Should these be treated the same way as rights under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago? Again, 
the intuitive answer may appear to be “no”. However, it cannot seriously be argued that common law 
rights are not “constitutional” rights, seeing that many of the rights declared in rights bills pre-existed 
and had their origins in the common law. Without prejudice to this or other relevant arguments I 
would contend that, again, the pertinent question relates to the consequences of the judicial error. If 
the proposition is accepted that the appropriate focus for control factors lies in the consequences of 
judicial error, then the issue is not the specie or source of the contravened right or even the 
civil/criminal nature of the proceedings.  
 
Legislatures may sometimes wish to impose control mechanisms in specific situations. Where 
legislation which is valid under the applicable hierarchy of norms covers a specific field, it may be that 
the courts ought to defer to the legislature. That would certainly be the case in the UK now; but the 
day may come when common law constitutionalism prevails and the most important common law 
norms and values will take precedence. Where the source of the right is constitutional legislation of 
some sort, there is a stronger case to adhere to any control mechanism clearly embedded in that 
legislation, and there may be no need to rely on wider common law values, although it is arguable that 
such strict adherence ought only to apply to rights that are created (not just declared) by that 
legislation. Where the legislation imposes no control mechanism, courts should consider the rights 
against the background of the core common law values. In such cases there is no compelling reason to 




The maxim ubi ius ibi remedium represents an ancient common law norm, rightly described as 
“fundamental” to the rule of law,
167
 itself arguably the core common law value. Both are threatened 
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when rights violations emanate from the judicial branch. Statutory compensation schemes are severely 
limited in scope, are (like ex gratia schemes) subject to executive discretions, and leave significant 
scope for a “remedial shortfall”. For injured parties to be solely dependent upon such schemes is 
“unfortunate”.
168
 Such schemes would best be treated as minima, rather than the apex of the redress 
process. Given the principles of judicial immunity, state liability perhaps represents the last legal 
remedy. Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2), among others, provides a viable 
model for such liability. Maharaj imposed two constraints. Both were justified in the context of the 
case itself. But here I would modify Maharaj by eliding the second constraint. My focus is on the 
consequences of judicial error rather than the nature or source of the rights at issue, or the category of 
judicial error. The targeted mischief is a “remedial shortfall” in cases of irretrievably injurious judicial 
error. Such a modified Maharaj liability is, it is submitted, a suitable antidote. This liability should be 
available in both civil and criminal cases. 
 
Common law rejections of state liability can be illuminated though not justified by underenforcement 
theory. When there exists any feasible model for providing effective redress, it is wrong to accord the 
state an unnecessary immunity, such that injured parties bear their own loss. In jurisdictions that do 
not have an entrenched bill of rights and/or that subscribe to the idea of legislative supremacy, it may 
well be that clear legislation could provide the necessary justification for judicial underenforcement of 
core common law values and norms, thereby preventing the courts from holding the state (and hence 
anyone) legally accountable for judicial wrongs. This is contestable.
169
 But when there is no clear, 
specific, and inescapable statutory impediment, the underenforcement propensities discussed above 
are indefensible, and should be abandoned. At the very least, a modified Maharaj-style primary state 
liability, transcending ex gratia or statutory schemes targeted at narrowly-defined notions of 
“miscarriage of justice”, ought to be embraced. This would go some way towards better compliance 
with rule of law values and would represent appropriate recognition of important common law norms. 
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Such a step could serve as a launch pad for subsequent developments in the common law; and such 
developments are essential. Sir John Laws has referred to “the common law’s process of continued 
self-correction”.
170
 Such a process would be welcome in this area. 
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